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I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission)
has faced a number of challenges in the last few years. Judge Rakoff’s
decision in Citigroup,1 the Madoff scandal,2 and the Business Roundtable
decision3 are just a few of the developments that have dealt lasting damage to the SEC’s reputation.4 Critics have scrutinized the agency’s
decisionmaking on multiple fronts—from its enforcement policy to the
quality of its rulemaking—and the SEC has largely come up short in the
analysis.5 The once-revered top cop6 of the securities markets has taken a
hit, and it is unclear whether it can recover.
*

Perry Golkin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. In SEC v. Citigroup, Judge Jed S. Rakoff refused to approve the settlement of an SEC enforcement action against Citigroup. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). In the context of his decision, Judge Rakoff raised a variety of questions and concerns about the SEC’s enforcement policies and settlement practices. See Order Directing Hearing,
SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7387 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/70540706/Judge-Rakoff-s-order-in-S-E-C-v-Citigroup-Global-Markets
(inviting the SEC to justify various of its policies). The case is currently on appeal to the Second
Circuit, which issued a preliminary opinion suggesting that it is likely to overturn the lower court’s
decision. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2012) (granting a stay of
the lower court’s order).
2. Bernie Madoff’s thirteen-billion dollar Ponzi scheme was reportedly the largest in history.
See Steven Pearlstein, SEC’s Gaping Blind Spots Kept Madoff’s Misdeeds Out of Sight, WASH.
POST, July 1, 2009, at A13 (describing the SEC’s failure to uncover a sixteen-year scheme despite
numerous inquiries and warnings); Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 654–58 (2010) (identifying
various explanations for the SEC’s failure to investigate the Madoff case more effectively).
3. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
4. See, e.g., David S. Hilzenrath, Madoff Case Haunts SEC as Panel Weighs Budget, WASH.
POST, Mar. 7, 2012, at A13 (reporting questions raised by a congressional panel about the SEC’s
budget request in light of its failure to detect Madoff’s Ponzi scheme).
5. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop: The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785
(2009) (describing criticisms of SEC regulatory and enforcement policies in the context of the 2008
financial crisis).
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The Business Roundtable decision is of particular importance. The
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(Dodd-Frank)7 tasked the SEC with an unprecedented number of required rulemakings.8 Although the SEC has failed to complete many of
these within the statutorily mandated time frames,9 the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act (JOBS Act),10 signed by President Obama on April
5, 2012, requires additional SEC rulemaking in connection with its implementation.11 Commentators have observed that these rulemakings
must withstand the rigorous scrutiny to which the D.C. Circuit subjected
the SEC’s proxy access rule.12 Indeed, the media reports that regulators
are “paralyzed” by the threat of litigation.13 The SEC has also announced

6. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the 2009 Southeastern Securities Conference (Mar. 19, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2009/spch031909tap.htm) (describing the SEC as “an agency with a tradition of excellence that
dates back 75 years”).
7. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(2) (Supp. IV
2010)).
8. See, e.g., DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, ENACTED INTO LAW ON JULY 21, 2010 (2010), available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413b-b870-b7c025ed2ecf/Presen
tation/PublicationAttachment/1d4495c7-0be0-4e9a-ba77-f786fb90464a/070910_Financial_Reform_
Summary.pdf (describing the Dodd-Frank Act as containing 243 required rulemakings and sixtyseven studies, including ninety-five rulemakings and seventeen studies directed specifically at the
SEC). Notably, the decision also threatens the rulemakings conducted by other agencies, some of
which face more substantial statutory requirements than the SEC. See, e.g., Sarah N. Lynch & Christopher Doering, Analysis: Bruised Regulators Brace for Dodd-Frank Court Fights, REUTERS (Aug.
4, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/04/us-financial-regulation-courts-idUSTRE7730K
220110804 (describing implications of the decision for CFTC rulemaking).
9. See, e.g., Karen Kroll, What’s the Holdup With Dodd-Frank Rulemaking?, COMPLIANCE
WEEK, May 8, 2012 (reporting that, as of May 1, 2012, two-thirds of Dodd-Frank rulemaking deadlines had been missed).
10. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
11. See, e.g., James Hamilton, SEC Chair Tells House Panel that SEC Rulemaking Teams
Working on Complex JOBS Act Implementing Regulations, DODD-FRANK NEWS CENTER (Apr. 25,
2012, 4:55 PM), http://financialreform.wolterskluwerlb.com/2012/04/sec-chair-tells-house-panelthat-sec-rulemaking-teams-working-on-complex-jobs-act-implementing-regul.html (recounting that
SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro told the House Financial Services Committee that “the rulemaking
required for implementation of many new JOBS Act provisions will be complex”); J. Robert Brown
Jr., The SEC and the Non-Cost Benefit Analysis (Part 4), RACE TO THE BOTTOM (Apr. 26, 2012,
6:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/the-sec-and-the-non-cost-benefit-analysisanalysis-part-4.html (describing some of the SEC rulemaking required by the JOBS Act).
12. See Brown, supra note 11 (noting that “Business Roundtable will require a lengthy and far
more detailed cost benefit analysis”).
13. Christopher Doering, Financial Regulators “Paralyzed” by Threat of Wall Street Lawsuits,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/08/financial-regulatorsparalyzed-threat-wall-street-lawsuits_n_1332294.html?ref=business.
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a number of changes to its rulemaking practices in response to the Business Roundtable decision.14
Rule 14a-11, the SEC’s proxy access rule, was clearly flawed, a
point I detail extensively in other work.15 It is unlikely, however, that
these flaws resulted from the SEC’s failure to conduct an adequate costbenefit analysis, the basis on which the D.C. Circuit invalidated the rule.
Similarly, it is unlikely that the SEC’s changes to its rulemaking procedures, which focus largely on the role of economic analysis, address the
true weaknesses in those procedures. Instead, this Article argues that the
SEC’s decisionmaking process is artificially constrained by structural
requirements that limit the agency’s effectiveness in formulating policy
and reaching consensus. As a result, the rationales for its rules are inadequately articulated, and the rules are poorly designed.
As a first step, it is necessary to evaluate the Business Roundtable
decision more carefully. This Article examines the decision and the context in which it was decided in Part II. In Part III, this Article discusses
the statutory obligations imposed on SEC rulemaking that the court applied in the Business Roundtable case—the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA)16 and section 2(b) of the Securities Act of 1933.17 Part IV explores two critical structural constraints on SEC rulemaking—the noticeand-comment procedure imposed by the APA, as well as the Government in the Sunshine Act (the Sunshine Act)18—and describes the practical effect that these constraints have on the rulemaking process in general and on Rule 14a-11 in particular. In Part V, this Article considers the
effect of Dodd-Frank’s legislative policy choices on judicial oversight of
agency rulemaking.
Bad rules make bad law, and Rule 14a-11 was arguably a bad
rule.19 But the flaws in SEC rulemaking are quite different from those
identified by the D.C. Circuit. At the same time, the Business Roundtable
decision was itself flawed. In evaluating the SEC’s decision to adopt a
proxy access rule, the D.C. Circuit completely disregarded the congres14. See, e.g., Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony Concerning
Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking (Apr. 17, 2012) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2012/ts041712mls.htm) (describing new staff guidance for
conducting economic analysis in connection with proposed rulemaking).
15. See generally Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY
L.J. 435 (2012).
16. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title
5).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b). Congress added the same language to § 3(f) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. See id. § 78c(f).
18. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976).
19. See generally Fisch, supra note 15 (describing flaws in Rule 14a-11).
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sional policy judgments reflected in Dodd-Frank. Congress played a critical role by explicitly authorizing the SEC to adopt a proxy access rule.
By substituting its own policy judgment for that of Congress, the D.C.
Circuit threatens not just the ability of administrative agencies to formulate regulatory policy, but also the ability of Congress to direct agency
policymaking. Explicit congressional determinations regarding regulatory policy warrant greater judicial deference than the courts have given to
them. At the same time, Congress may implicitly subject the agency’s
implementation of that policy to greater scrutiny as to whether the agency has been faithful to its legislative directive.
II. THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE DECISION
A. Background to the Decision: The Proxy Access Rule
The starting point of this Article is the D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Business Roundtable.20 This case presented a challenge to the legitimacy
of Rule 14a-11, the proxy access rule that the SEC adopted in 2010.21
Notably, Congress explicitly authorized the SEC to adopt a proxy access
rule in section 971 of Dodd-Frank.22 Although the SEC had been considering some form of proxy access for seventy years23 and had issued a
notice of proposed rulemaking prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank,24 it
did not act until after Congress formally authorized a proxy access rule.25
I have described the provisions of Rule 14a-11 in detail elsewhere.26 To summarize, the rule would have required public companies
20. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
21. Rule 14a-11 was reserved from the 2010 Code of Federal Regulations pending litigation
over its validity in the D.C. Circuit. After the rule was invalidated in Business Roundtable, the 2011
Code of Federal Regulations omitted the rule entirely. The rule as adopted can be found at Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,677–93 (proposed Sept. 16, 2010).
22. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2010)).
23. See Fisch, supra note 15 (observing that the SEC first considered some form of the proxy
access rule in 1942).
24. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (proposed June 18,
2009).
25. Among the obstacles to the SEC’s prior adoption of a proxy access rule were concerns
about whether the agency possessed the necessary statutory authority. See, e.g., Letter from David
Hirschmann, Senior Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Aug. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1009/s71009-181.pdf (stating that the SEC’s proposed proxy access rule was “beyond the Commission’s authority”); Jill E. Fisch, Professor, Statement During SEC Roundtable Discussion on Proposed Security Holder Director Nomination Rules (Mar. 12, 2004) (prepared statement available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-nominations/fisch031204.pdf) (citing legislative history of federal
securities laws in response to concerns about the agency’s statutory authority).
26. See generally Fisch, supra note 15 (describing and criticizing the SEC’s proxy access rule).
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to include a limited number of director candidates nominated by large
shareholders on the issuer’s proxy statement. To qualify to nominate director candidates, a shareholder was required to have held at least three
percent of the company’s stock for three years or more.27 Shareholders
were not permitted to use Rule 14a-11 to seek control of an issuer.28 Neither issuers nor states were permitted to create a mechanism by which an
individual company could opt out of the required proxy access procedure.29
The Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
which had previously threatened to challenge an SEC rule mandating
proxy access30 and had successfully challenged other SEC rulemaking
efforts,31 filed their complaint just a month after the rule was adopted.32
The petitioners argued, among other claims, that the SEC’s adoption of
Rule 14a-11 was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA and
that the SEC failed to adequately assess the rule’s effect on efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.33
B. The Circuit Court Decision
The D.C. Circuit vacated Rule 14a-11, agreeing with the petitioners
that the SEC had acted arbitrarily and capriciously.34 In particular, the
court observed that the SEC has “a unique obligation to consider the effect of a new rule upon ‘efficiency, competition, and capital formation.’”35 In concluding that the SEC had failed to meet this obligation,
the court largely faulted the quality of the SEC’s economic analysis.36
The court identified several ways in which the SEC had, in the court’s
27. Id. at 463.
28. Id. at 475–76.
29. Id. at 490.
30. See, e.g., John F. Hartigan et al., Proposed Corporate Governance Changes Applicable to
Public Companies, MORGAN LEWIS (June 14, 2010), http://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/publ
icationID/0e1078ef-16be-40dc-8c84-bfba6c2e528c/fuseaction/publication.detail (describing the
proxy access proposal as “perhaps the most controversial and potentially divisive aspect of the corporate governance reforms” and observing that the Chamber of Commerce had threatened litigation
if the SEC adopted the proposal).
31. See infra Part II.C (describing other successful challenges to SEC rulemaking).
32. See Petition for Review, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 101305).
33. Id. at 2. The complaint also alleged that proxy access rules exceeded the SEC’s authority
and violated the petitioners’ First and Fifth Amendment rights under the Constitution. Id. The D.C.
Circuit did not reach these issues.
34. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148.
35. Id.
36. Id. (explaining that the agency acted arbitrarily by failing “adequately to assess the economic effects of a new rule”).
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opinion, failed to estimate or quantify the potential costs of proxy access
properly or failed to obtain sufficient empirical data to support its conclusions.37 On issues for which commentators had presented the SEC
with competing economic analysis, the court criticized the agency’s failure to “make tough choices about which of the competing estimates is
most plausible.”38
The Business Roundtable decision was noteworthy for several reasons. First and foremost was the level of vitriol in the opinion. The court
did not simply fault the SEC’s rulemaking procedures; it characterized
the SEC as acting “inconsistently and opportunistically”39 and its reasons
for acting as “unutterably mindless.”40 The court stated that the SEC’s
rejection of the petitioners’ prediction of the potential costs of issuer opposition to shareholder nominees “had no basis beyond mere speculation.”41 The court described the SEC as “ducking serious evaluation of
the costs that could be imposed [by special interests].”42 Notwithstanding
the fact that SEC rulemakings are conducted by scores of staff members
and ultimately adopted by a commission whose composition changes
over time, the opinion seemed to attribute a stable (and deficient) institutional character to both the SEC and its rulemakings, describing the
agency as having “failed once again” to conduct an adequate cost-benefit
analysis.43
These statements suggest that the court was not merely challenging
the SEC’s rulemaking process, but was questioning its good faith in analyzing the desirability of the rule. Although the court did not identify a
basis for this concern, its language seemed to highlight the particular
vulnerability of the agency’s reputation and institutional competence.
The court did not defer to the SEC’s rationale for its rulemaking, its
evaluation of the quality of alternatives and data presented by industry
37. See, e.g., id. at 1150 (stating that the SEC “did nothing to estimate and quantify the costs it
expected companies to incur”).
38. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Commentators have argued that the
court’s empirical analysis was, itself, “cursory.” See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie,
The Bizarre Law & Economics of Business Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J. CORP. L. 1, 25, 30 (2012).
39. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148.
40. Id. at 1156.
41. Id. at 1150.
42. Id. at 1152.
43. Id. at 1148. Notably, one of the cases cited by the court in characterizing the SEC as a
repeat offender—specifically, the Chamber of Commerce case—was decided in 2004 by a Commission of which none of the five commissioners who considered Rule 14a-11 was a member. See SEC
Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/
about/sechistoricalsummary.htm (last updated Dec. 17, 2012) (describing periods of service of SEC
commissioners and showing that none of the commissioners who considered Rule 14a-11 joined the
Commission until 2006 or after).
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participants, or its assessment of the methodology of studies included in
the public-comment file.44 At the same time that the court criticized the
SEC for inappropriately discounting commentators’ predictions about the
costs of the rule, the court branded the agency as inconsistent for increasing the qualification requirements to use Rule 14a-11 from its original
rule proposal—a change that would lower costs by reducing the number
of shareholder nominations.45 In short, the court’s statements were less
about the SEC’s failure to assess costs and benefits than the SEC’s erroneous assessment.
Ultimately, the court appeared to make an independent policy
judgment that, notwithstanding the SEC’s view, proxy access is a bad
idea. At the same time, language in the opinion suggested the possibility
that an SEC determination that differed from that of the court (or even
from that of the petitioners) was, as a result, arbitrary.46 This approach
reflects a marked contrast to the Second Circuit’s recent statement in the
Citigroup case, which reflects the more traditional deference to agency
policymaking.47 As the Citigroup court observed, “[i]t is not . . . the
proper function of federal courts to dictate policy to executive administrative agencies.”48 The D.C. Circuit’s substitution of its policy judgment
for that of the SEC both differs from this traditional deference and poses
a threat to future agency rulemaking efforts.
C. The Business Roundtable Opinion in Context
The D.C. Circuit’s criticism of Rule 14a-11 must be understood in
context. Business Roundtable was not the first D.C. Circuit decision in
recent history to invalidate an SEC rule. Indeed, in the Business
Roundtable opinion, the court highlighted two other recent occasions on
which it had invalidated SEC rulemaking: American Equity49 and Chamber of Commerce.50 In 2010, the D.C. Circuit in American Equity struck
down an SEC rule providing that fixed, indexed annuities did not constitute annuity contracts within the meaning of the Securities Act and were,
44. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151 (criticizing the SEC for relying on “two relatively unpersuasive studies”). So long as the studies persuaded the SEC, the statutory origin of a
requirement that they also persuade the reviewing court is illusive.
45. Id. at 1152–53.
46. See, e.g., id. at 1150–51 (implying that SEC acted arbitrarily in concluding that Rule 14a11 would improve board performance and in rejecting an empirical study purporting to reach the
opposite conclusion).
47. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2012).
48. Id. at 163.
49. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
50. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

702

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 36:695

therefore, subject to federal securities regulation rather than merely state
insurance law.51
Significantly, despite holding that the SEC’s Rule 151A was entitled to Chevron deference,52 the court invalidated the rule, concluding
that the agency’s section 2(b) analysis was “flawed.”53 Notably, the SEC
had made specific findings, as required by section 2(b) of the Securities
Act, with respect to the rule’s effect on “efficiency, competition and capital formation.”54 Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit disagreed with the SEC’s
conclusions. Specifically, the court faulted the SEC for insufficiently
analyzing these factors under the preexisting state-law regulatory regime.55 The court concluded that the SEC’s failure to analyze these factors under “the existing state law regime renders arbitrary and capricious
the SEC’s judgment that applying federal securities law” would constitute an improvement.56
Business Roundtable also relied heavily on the court’s prior decision in Chamber of Commerce.57 In Chamber of Commerce, the court
reviewed the SEC’s adoption of mutual fund reforms requiring the
boards to have an increased percentage of independent directors and an
independent board chairman.58 The court found that the rule changes
were within the SEC’s statutory authority to adopt and consistent with
congressional intent. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the rule
changes were invalid because the SEC had failed to sufficiently quantify
the costs associated with their adoption;59 this failure, it held, was inconsistent with the agency’s obligations under the analogue to section 2(b)
in the Investment Company Act.60
In contrast to the court in Business Roundtable, the Chamber of
Commerce court stated that the SEC was not required to conduct an empirical study to determine the benefits of its new rules, noting that “depending upon the nature of the problem, an agency may be ‘entitled to
conduct . . . a general analysis based on informed conjecture.’”61 None51. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d at 167–68.
52. Id. at 175–76. Notably, the Business Roundtable decision does not discuss Chevron deference.
53. Id. at 177.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b).
55. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d at 177–78.
56. Id. at 179.
57. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
58. See Investment Company Governance, 17 C.F.R. pt. 270 (2004).
59. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144.
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c).
61. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 142 (quoting Melcher v. FCC, 134 F.3d 1143, 1158
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (omission in original)).
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theless, the court found that the SEC had failed to consider adequately
the cost of its new requirements as well as a disclosure alternative to the
requirement of an independent board chair.62
Other recent D.C. Circuit decisions evaluating the validity of SEC
rules follow a similar pattern. In Goldstein v. SEC,63 the court invalidated
a rule requiring hedge fund registration (a requirement that Congress
subsequently imposed by statute in Dodd-Frank).64 The SEC adopted the
rule in response to the rapid growth of the hedge fund industry, which,
according to the SEC, posed several problems including the growing access of retail investors to hedge fund investments and the potential for
fraud.65 The court rejected the SEC’s rule as an arbitrary departure from
its prior regulatory policy. The court specifically discounted the agency’s
findings concerning developments in the industry and the growing economic significance of hedge funds to the capital markets.66
In NetCoalition v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit invalidated an SEC order
approving a requested fee change by NYSE Arca, a self-regulatory organization registered with the SEC as a national securities exchange.67
Specifically, Arca proposed to begin charging a fee for its proprietary
“depth of book data.”68 Although the court conceded that the SEC acted
within the scope of its authority and that its choice of approach in evaluating the proposed rule change was reasonable, the court nonetheless
found that the agency had failed to disclose a “reasoned basis” for concluding that the proposed pricing was reasonable.69
Finally, in Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC, the court invalidated
an SEC rule that broadened the exemption for broker-dealers from regulation under the Investment Advisers Act (IAA) in order to permit broker-dealers to create alternative fee structures for customer accounts
without being subject to regulation under the IAA.70 Financial Planning
Ass’n differs somewhat from the prior cases because the SEC was acting
under a statute that explicitly authorized it to exempt persons from the
62. Id. at 143.
63. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
64. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 403, 124 Stat. 1376, 1570–71 (2010).
65. Goldstein, 412 F.3d at 882.
66. See id. (noting that the dissenting commissioners “doubted it”). In addition, the court held
that the SEC’s interpretation of the term “client” was unreasonable because it created inconsistencies
in the scope of regulation provided by the IAA. Id.
67. NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Under the Securities Act, national
securities exchanges are required to file proposed rule and fee changes with the SEC for approval.
The SEC subjects these proposals to its standard notice-and-comment procedure. See id. at 528.
68. Id. at 531.
69. Id. at 544.
70. 482 F.3d 481, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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IAA.71 The court held that this language did not apply because brokerdealers who did not receive special compensation were already named in
one of the congressionally enumerated exemptions.72
This history of repeated invalidations of SEC rulemakings by the
D.C. Circuit suggests some degree of distrust of the SEC’s policymaking
judgments. The extent to which this distrust may stem from the agency’s
involvement in various embarrassments and scandals is unclear. Since
the 2008 financial crisis, the SEC has been the target of a series of attacks on its competence, credibility, and policymaking, and the number
of agency missteps and problems has been shockingly high. I have written elsewhere, for example, of the extensive criticism directed at the SEC
over its administration of the Consolidated Supervised Entities program,
its failure to detect the massive fraud perpetrated by Bernie Madoff, alleged improprieties in the agency’s investigation of possible insider trading at Pequot Capital Management, and several other issues.73 In 2010, a
former SEC lawyer was convicted of criminal conspiracy for his participation in a fraudulent “pump and dump” stock scheme.74 In 2011, a highprofile study reported the extent of the revolving door that exists between
SEC employment and the subsequent representation of private clients in
dealings with the agency.75 Even as the D.C. Circuit was announcing its
Business Roundtable decision, the media was reporting on the SEC’s
widespread destruction of documents relating to its investigations.76 At
the same time, the SEC entered into a lease for 900,000 square feet of
office space that it did not need and lacked the budget to pay for, a deci-

71. The Investment Advisers Act provides that an investment adviser did not include “such
other persons not within the intent of this paragraph, as the Commission may designate by rules and
regulations or order.” 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(H).
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (exempting “any broker or dealer whose performance of
such services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no special compensation therefor”).
73. See generally Fisch, supra note 5.
74. Kara Scannell, Jury Convicts Former SEC Lawyer, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704194504575031941422210152.html.
75. David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Staff’s ‘Revolving Door’ Prompts Concerns About Agency’s
Independence, WASH. POST (May 13, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
sec-staffs-revolving-door-prompts-concerns-about-agencys-independence/2011/05/12/AF9F0f1G_st
ory.html. More recently, a former SEC lawyer settled criminal charges that he violated SEC ethics
rules and continued to represent a client after being told by the SEC that he had a conflict of interest.
See Andrew Harris, Ex-SEC Enforcer Settles Stanford Ethics Dispute with U.S., BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.business week.com/news/2012-01-18/ex-sec-enforcersettles-stanford-ethics-dispute-with-u-s-.html.
76. Matt Taibbi, Is the SEC Covering Up Wall Street Crimes?, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 17,
2011), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/is-the-sec-covering-up-wall-street-crimes-201108
17.
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sion that the Inspector General termed “a deeply flawed and unsound
analysis.”77
These problems likely carried particular weight at the D.C. Circuit,
which, because of its location and specialized caseload, is particularly
sensitive to the functioning of the regulatory agencies.78 It would not be
unreasonable to conclude that the rulemaking and policy judgments of an
agency that cannot even exercise its leasing authority appropriately
should be subjected to careful scrutiny. The D.C. Circuit’s reluctance to
uphold SEC rules against challenge, however, predates the series of recent scandals. Two of the best known decisions invalidating SEC rulemaking were the D.C. Circuit’s prior Business Roundtable decision in
1990 overturning the SEC’s one-share, one-vote rule79 and its decision in
American Bankers Ass’n80 requiring banks that engaged in securities
business to register as broker-dealers.81 Although the court may have
become more demanding in its recent scrutiny, its skepticism of SEC
rulemaking is not a new development.
Of course, the SEC is not the only agency to have suffered the invalidation of its rules at the hand of the D.C. Circuit.82 Nor is it the only
agency to have its rules subjected to the intense “hard look” scrutiny that
appears to shift from procedural oversight to substantive review.83 On the
other hand, the string of securities cases is notable because in no case did

77. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON INVESTIGATION:
IMPROPER ACTIONS RELATING TO THE LEASING OF OFFICE SPACE 2 (2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/oig-553.pdf.
78. Commentators have suggested that this familiarity may lead to greater court skepticism of
agency rulemaking decisions. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of
Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 795 (2008) (reporting that D.C. Circuit judges are
“much less willing to validate the decisions of the EPA and the NLRB in arbitrariness cases than are
judges in other circuits”).
79. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
80. Am. Bankers Ass’n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
81. The rule, which the SEC adopted after an administrative reinterpretation of the GlassSteagall Act, responded to the new entry of banks into the brokerage market. This entry was facilitated by the subsequent repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999. To the extent that, as some commentators
argue, the repeal of Glass-Steagall was a contributing factor in the financial crisis because of its role
in increasing the size and interdependence of the big banks, the SEC’s attempt to regulate bank
brokerage activities through Rule 3b-9 now appears perspicacious. See, e.g., Peter L. Bernstein,
What’s
Free
About
Free
Enterprise?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
27,
2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/business/28view.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1 (describing the
repeal of Glass-Steagall as “a key contributor to the calamities now gripping the banking system”).
82. See, e.g., EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, No. 11-1302, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS
17535 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 21, 2012) (invalidating EPA’s transport rule).
83. See discussion infra Part III.A (describing hard look review).
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the D.C. Circuit uphold a challenged SEC rule.84 The result of the SEC’s
repeated inability to defend its rules against attack is an absence of decisions that validate a specific rulemaking process or that articulate the
type of analysis that meets the judicial standard for cost-benefit analysis—the type of decisions that could serve as a roadmap for future agency action.
The absence of decisions of this type stands in contrast to the
court’s oversight of other agencies.85 For example, Professors Thomas
Miles and Cass Sunstein empirically studied published appellate decisions from 1996 to 2006 reviewing actions by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).86 The
authors found that the courts validated agency decisions at an overall rate
of sixty-four percent.87 Similarly, William Jordan’s study of D.C. Circuit
remands of agency rules between 1985 and 1995 found that, although the
invalidations often resulted in temporary setbacks, the agencies involved
successfully implemented their policies in approximately eighty percent
of the cases in which the D.C. Circuit had originally remanded rules as
arbitrary and capricious.88 Although empirical data is limited on the
manner in which courts apply hard look analysis, to the extent that the
D.C. Circuit’s approach to SEC rulemaking is exceptional, it may in part
reflect an inherent judicial skepticism about the extent to which financial
regulation truly involves complex scientific or technical analysis that is
within the particular competence of the agency such that deference to the
agency’s judgment is warranted.89
84. The Supreme Court upheld the SEC’s promulgation of Rule 14e-3, an insider trading provision, in an appeal of the criminal prosecution of James O’Hagan. See United States v. O’Hagan,
521 U.S. 642 (1997). The opinion did not subject the rule to the type of analysis applied by the D.C.
Circuit in the cases discussed in the text. See id. But see id. at 680 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1997),
reversed, 521 U.S. 642. The Northern District of California upheld Rule 13b2-2 against a challenge
in the criminal case of United States v. Reyes, but the opinion did not contain an analysis of the
rulemaking process. United States v. Reyes, No. C 06-00556 CRB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41632
(N.D. Cal. May 30, 2007); see also Levy v. Sterling Holding Co. 544 F.3d 493 (3d Cir. 2008) (upholding SEC’s amendments to rules under § 16 and the retroactive application of those rules to the
case at bar).
85. See, e.g., Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc., v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(rejecting a challenge to EPA rules regulating the emission of greenhouse gases).
86. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 78.
87. Id. at 767; see also Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory
Policy?: An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825 (2006).
88. William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 393, 440 (2000).
89. Cf. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 117 (stating that the EPA had made “a
‘scientific judgment’ about the potential risks greenhouse gas emissions pose to public health or
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D. The Response to Business Roundtable
Commentators interpreted Business Roundtable as a strong statement that the SEC needed to improve its cost-benefit analysis. As one
law firm commentator observed, “[w]e were struck by just how meticulous the DC Circuit panel expected the SEC to be in assessing the ‘economic effects’ of its rules.”90 To examine further the quality of the SEC’s
economic analysis, the SEC Inspector General conducted two separate
studies reviewing the SEC’s rulemaking process with respect to particular Dodd-Frank rulemakings.91 Similarly, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) conducted a study, required by Congress under DoddFrank, of the SEC’s rulemaking process.92 In response to the concerns
noted in the Business Roundtable decision and these studies, the SEC
adopted new staff guidance on economic analysis in its rulemaking.93 In
testimony before Congress, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro described the
new steps that the SEC staff was taking to improve the economic analysis in its rulemaking process.94
welfare—not policy discussions”); id. at 120 (“[W]e give an extreme degree of deference to the
agency when it is evaluating scientific data within its technical expertise.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Huls Am. Inc. v. Browner, 83 F.3d 445, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that the court owes
an “extreme degree of deference to the agency when it is evaluating scientific data within its technical expertise”); FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 813–14 (1978) (holding
that the FCC, in making “judgmental or predictive” factual determinations, did not need “complete
factual support” because “a forecast of the direction in which future public interest lies necessarily
involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency”).
90. Melinda Brunger et al., DC Circuit Panel Vacates Proxy Access Rule, ANDREWS KURTH
(July 28, 2011), http://www.andrewskurth.com/pressroom-publications-815.html.
91. The report on the first study, which examined six specified rulemakings, was released on
June 13, 2011. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF REVIEW OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSES PERFORMED BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION IN
CONNECTION WITH DODD-FRANK RULEMAKINGS (2011), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Re
ports/AuditsInspections/2011/Report_6_13_11.pdf [hereinafter OIG REPORT I]. Although the report
identified a few possible areas of improvement, it concluded that the rulemaking procedures had
complied with the spirit of the cost-benefit analysis set out in the executive orders and that the agency had identified and reviewed possible alternatives to the proposed rules. Id. at 41. The second
study was released in January 2012. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES IN SELECTED SEC DODD-FRANK ACT
RULEMAKINGS (2012), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2012/
Rpt%20499_FollowUpReviewofD-F_CostBenefitAnalyses_508.pdf [hereinafter OIG REPORT II].
92. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-151, DODD-FRANK ACT REGULATIONS:
IMPLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND COORDINATION (2011),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d12151.pdf.
93. Memorandum from the Div. of Risk, Strategy & Fin. Innovation and the Office of Gen.
Counsel to the Staff of the Rulewriting Divs. & Offices (Mar. 16, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_guidance_econ_analy_secrulemaking.pdf.
94. See Schapiro, supra note 14. The steps included greater involvement of economists in the
rulemaking process; more specific explanations of the justifications for the rule; greater differentiation between the economic impacts resulting from the congressional mandate and those resulting
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These steps may not be sufficient to satisfy all policymakers. In
June 2011, Representative Scott Garrett introduced H.R. 2308, the SEC
Regulatory Accountability Act.95 Among other things, H.R. 2308 proposes to establish explicit requirements for cost-benefit analyses for
Commission rules and orders.96 The bill would also require the SEC to
review its regulations at least once every five years to determine whether
any are “outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome.”97 In addition, the bill would require the SEC to state, for all major
rules, the purposes and intended consequences of the rules, and to identify metrics to measure, after adoption, whether the rule has accomplished
the stated purposes.
Although the foregoing criticisms suggest that the SEC’s use of
cost-benefit analysis is distinctively deficient, studies suggest that the
expectations of the Business Roundtable court and some commentators
are outside the norm employed by agencies generally and, more problematically, are unrealistic. A 2011 report to the Senate from the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
examines several federal agencies’ rulemakings under Dodd-Frank.98 For
example, the Committee observed that, of 192 proposed and adopted
Dodd-Frank rules, over a quarter had no cost-benefit analysis at all; over
a third had entirely nonquantitative cost-benefit analysis; and of the fifty
rules containing quantitative analysis, the majority were limited to administrative and similar costs and therefore failed to account for the
rules’ expected broader economic impact.99
Similarly, the Office of Management and Budget’s 2011 Report to
Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations stated that, of
the sixty-six major rules promulgated by executive agencies in 2010, the
from the exercise of agency discretion; more extensive discussion and quantification of costs and
benefits; “more integrated analysis of economic issues (including efficiency, competition, and capital formation)”; explicit encouragement for commenters to provide quantitative information, and
discussion of the information provided; and greater discussion of alternatives that the SEC had rejected. Id.
95. SEC Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011, H.R. 2308, 112th Cong. (2011). A similar bill
was introduced to the Senate in April 2012. SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, S. 2373, 112th
Cong. (2011).
96. H.R. 2308 § 2(e)(1)(b) (“Before promulgating a regulation under the securities laws . . . the
Commission shall . . . propose or adopt a regulation or order only on a reasoned determination that
the benefits of the intended regulation or order justify the costs of the intended regulation or order.”).
97. Id. § 2(e)(4).
98. Letter from Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation to Congress (Mar. 7, 2012), available at
http://capmktsreg.org/pdfs/2012.03.07_CBA_letter.pdf.
99. Media Advisory, Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, CCMR Warns That Inadequate
Cost-Benefit Analysis Opens Dodd-Frank Rulemaking to Challenge and Delay (Mar. 7, 2012),
available at http://capmktsreg.org/pdfs/2012.03.07_CBA_letter.pdf.
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issuing agencies quantified and monetized both costs and benefits for
only eighteen.100 Of the seventeen major rules promulgated by independent agencies in 2010, the issuing agencies subjected none to an analysis
of both anticipated costs and benefits.101
The utility and practicality of cost-benefit analysis has, of course,
been widely debated, and an extensive discussion of this debate is beyond the scope of this Article.102 It is clear, however, that the increased
emphasis on cost-benefit analysis has slowed the SEC’s progress on
adopting the new regulations required by Dodd-Frank and the JOBS
Act.103 Since Business Roundtable, the pace of SEC rulemaking has
slowed by about half, largely due to the agency’s effort to analyze costs
and benefits more comprehensively.104 The concern is that, absent adequate cost-benefit analysis, the agency’s rules face a continued risk of
invalidation by the D.C. Circuit. The next Part considers, in more detail,
the legal bases for such invalidation.
III. STATUTORY LIMITS ON SEC RULEMAKING
The Business Roundtable decision is based on the federal courts’
obligation to ensure that agency rulemaking is consistent with the constraints imposed by Congress. SEC rulemaking must conform to the requirements of the APA and the more specific requirements of section
2(b) of the Securities Act. These constraints, as well as the impact from
judicial interpretations of such constraints, are addressed in this Part.
A. The Administrative Procedure Act
The APA sets out the ground rules for judicial review of agency
rulemaking.105 The APA instructs a reviewing court to invalidate agency
action that is “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,
100. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO CONGRESS
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE,
LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 3 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/inforeg/2011_cb/2011_cba_report.pdf.
101. Id. at 4.
102. See, e.g., William H. Rodgers, Jr., Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health & Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 193–201 (1980) (identifying difficulties in
applying cost-benefit analysis to environmental regulation).
103. See Edward Wyatt, At House Hearing, Schapiro Says Cost Analyses Are Slowing S.E.C.’s
Work, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 25, 2012, 3:35 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/
04/25/at-house-hearing-schapiro-says-cost-analyses-are-slowing-s-e-c-s-work/.
104. Steven Sloan, Schapiro Says SEC Will Change Cost Calculation of Regulation,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 17, 2012, 7:58 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-17/schapirosays-sec-will-change-cost-calculation-of-regulation-1-.html.
105. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2006).
ON THE
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or short of statutory right.”106 In addition, the reviewing court is required
to strike down actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”107
In applying the APA, courts determine whether an agency has acted
within the scope of its statutory authority using a deferential standard of
review commonly known as “Chevron deference.”108 Although Chevron
is often described as having “revolutionized the jurisprudence of agency
deference,”109 courts apply Chevron deference surprisingly infrequently.110 Modern courts closely review the factual record and reasons justifying the agency’s policy choices.111 Commentators have termed this
closer scrutiny “hard look” review.112 The U.S. Supreme Court set out
the dominant formulation of the rationality requirement in the State Farm
case:
An agency rule [is] arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied
on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before
the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.113

As the Court explained, “the agency must examine the relevant data and
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”114

106. Id. § 706(2)(C).
107. Id. § 706(2)(A).
108. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The
Chevron Court explained, “We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to
an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.” Id. at
844.
109. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1093
(2008).
110. See id. at 1090 (“[F]rom the time it was handed down until the end of the 2005 term,
Chevron was applied in only 8.3% of Supreme Court cases evaluating agency statutory interpretations.”).
111. See, e.g., Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1451 (2005) (“[I]n the 1970s and 1980s, the ‘hard look’
doctrine evolved, requiring agencies to provide rational explanations for their decisions, justify
departures from past practices, allow participation by a wide range of interested constituencies, and
consider reasonable alternatives.”).
112. See, e.g., Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505,
525 (1985) (describing the emergence, in the 1970s, of “a new, more rigorous scope of review under
the arbitrary and capricious standard—a scope of review known as the ‘hard look’”).
113. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
114. Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
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In squaring hard look review with the principles underlying Chevron deference,115 the Supreme Court justified State Farm’s process-based
emphasis in terms of permitting judicial oversight under the APA. Courts
may have greater competence in overseeing the process by which an
agency formulates its decision than in evaluating the policies underlying
that decision.116 The D.C. Circuit has stated that reviewing the procedures by which agencies adopt legislative rules falls within the court’s
“area of competence” and “contribute[s] to the rationality and fairness of
agency decision making without detracting unduly from its effectiveness.”117 Hard look review has also been defended as preserving the lawfulness of agency action, ensuring that the agency develop a factual record upon which to deploy its technical expertise, ensuring public participatory values in policy formulation, and protecting the agency’s determination from politically charged interest-group domination.118
Nonetheless, hard look review has generated substantial controversy. Much of the controversy stems from the fact that, as in the Business
Roundtable decision, hard look review appears to have morphed from
process-based review into substantive review,119 with the court overturning agency decisions on the basis of its own policy preferences.120
Courts, of course, deny that they are making independent policy judgments,121 but as in Business Roundtable, this denial is often implausible.
115. For a more extensive discussion of Chevron deference and its scope, see Thomas W.
Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001).
116. See generally Matthew Warren, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the Development
of the Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 GEO. L.J. 2599 (2002) (identifying three distinctive justifications for the hard look doctrine among three D.C. Circuit court judges).
117. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see Envtl.
Def. Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“When administrators provide a
framework for principled decision-making, the result will be to diminish the importance of judicial
review by enhancing the integrity of the administrative process . . . .”).
118. See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 111 (defending cost-benefit analysis as a tool for combating
political influence over agency rulemaking).
119. But see FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (overturning a lower court’s
decision to apply an overly high standard in reviewing rationality of agency rulemaking).
120. See, e.g., Miles & Sunstein, supra note 78, at 806–07 (“The best conclusion is that in its
operation, arbitrariness review is significantly affected by the ideological dispositions of federal
judges in a way that produces serious errors in light of the aspirations of State Farm itself.”). Courts
may be skeptical of agency policy judgments for many reasons ranging from the politicization of
agency rulemaking to concerns over agency capture. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory
and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1039–44, 1059–67 (1997) (“[M]any federal judges became convinced that agencies were prone to capture and related defects and—more
importantly—that they were in a position to do something about it.”). The extent to which these
concerns justify more intrusive judicial oversight is beyond the scope of this essay.
121. See, e.g., Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc., v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 122 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (“As with other reviews of administrative proceedings, we do not determine the convincing
force of evidence, nor the conclusion it should support . . . .”).
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The D.C. Circuit appears to have extended hard look analysis in
Business Roundtable and its predecessor cases by adding a specific requirement concerning cost-benefit analysis. In Business Roundtable, the
court stated that the SEC is required to “apprise itself—and hence the
public and the Congress—of the economic consequences of a proposed
regulation.”122 The source of this additional obligation is unclear.123
The only authorities cited by the court for the requirement are the
court’s prior decisions in Chamber of Commerce124 and Public Citizen.125
Presumably, because Public Citizen dealt with rulemaking by the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration and not the SEC, the applicability
of that decision to the Business Roundtable context implies that the required cost-benefit analysis is a component of the APA and not an agency-specific statute.126 But, although Chamber of Commerce describes this
obligation as “statutory,”127 neither of the prior decisions refers to any
specific statute that requires an agency to determine the economic consequences of a proposed rule.128
One might, of course, argue that adopting a regulation without
evaluating its costs and benefits is inherently irrational,129 but the authority of a reviewing court to invalidate an agency rule on the basis of
an inadequate cost-benefit analysis is not obvious. Indeed, a plausible
argument can be made that the absence of such a requirement is the rea122. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
123. That cost-benefit analysis is not an inherent requirement for all agency rulemaking is
highlighted by the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in Coalition for Responsible Regulation, in which
the court specifically held that cost-benefit analysis was not required because it had nothing to do
with the question before the EPA. 684 F.3d at 118; see also Schapiro, supra note 14 (“No statute
expressly requires the Commission to conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis as part of its rulemaking
activities . . . .”).
124. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
125. Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 374 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
126. Notably, Public Citizen involved rulemaking pursuant to a specific statute in which Congress directed the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMSCA) to consider specific factors
that have no relevance outside the case-specific context. Id. The holding in that case was based on
the FMCSA’s failure to consider one of those statutorily mandated factors; the subsequent discussion of cost-benefit analysis to which the Chamber of Commerce court refers was dicta. See id. at
1217 (“[W]e will not render final decision on petitioners’ other objections to the rule, as the failure
of the agency to consider the statutorily mandated factor is dispositive . . . .”).
127. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 143.
128. See id. (describing the SEC’s “statutory obligation to determine as best it can the economic implications of the rule it has proposed”).
129. Indeed, SEC chairmen have repeatedly stated that there is an expectation that the SEC
would conduct cost-benefit analysis. See OIG REPORT I, supra note 91, at 4. On the other hand, one
recent empirical study found that the quality of an agency’s cost-benefit analysis is not correlated
with the net benefits of the rule. See generally Stuart Shapiro & John F. Morrall III, The Triumph of
Regulatory Politics: Benefit-Cost Analysis and Political Salience, 6 REG. & GOVERNANCE 189
(2012).
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son that the President imposed such an obligation on executive branch
(but not independent) agencies through Executive Orders 12866 and
13563.130 Congress has also included an obligation to conduct costbenefit analysis in specific statutes, 131 but it has not incorporated a universal requirement of cost-benefit analysis into the APA.132 The Supreme
Court has explicitly stated that, in the absence of specific statutory language, an obligation to conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis is not inferred.133
In addition, empirical analysis of proposed rulemaking has obvious
limitations. It is difficult to predict the effect that a new rule will have,
particularly with respect to financial-market regulation. Regulated entities may perceive the rule as changing existing norms and engage in substantial compliance or seek to avoid the rule through regulatory arbitrage.
In addition, empirical analysis frequently requires regulators to extrapolate from transactions that are not comparable to those contemplated under the proposal.134 Thus, the reliability of empirical evidence, even
when carefully compiled, is questionable.
B. Section 2(b) Review
Congress has supplemented the rationality requirements of the APA
with more particularized criteria to which SEC rulemaking must adhere.
Although Congress originally authorized the SEC in the Securities and
130. Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4,
1993); Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821
(Jan. 21, 2011).
131. Congress has also, where appropriate, required agencies to follow specific rulemaking
procedures in addition to those mandated by the APA, but when doing so, Congress generally uses
precise language setting out its mandate. See, e.g., Schiller v. Tower Semiconductor, Ltd., 449 F.3d
286, 300 n.14 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing, as an example, rulemaking procedures mandated for the EPA
by the Clean Air Act).
132. The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has the authority to forbid agencies
from conducting cost-benefit analysis. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 217–18
(2009). As Justice Breyer observed in his separate opinion, Congress might have legitimate reasons
for seeking to reduce an agency’s reliance on cost-benefit analysis, including concerns that “[t]he
preparation of formal cost-benefit analyses can take too much time, thereby delaying regulation . . .
[and possibly causing the agency to] emphasize easily quantifiable factors over more qualitative
factors.” Id. at 232 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. See, e.g., Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. at 238–39 (“Indeed, this Court has recognized that
when Congress has intended that an agency engage in cost benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated
such intent on the face of the statute.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Am. Textile
Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510 (1981) (“When Congress has intended that an agency
engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on the face of the statute.”).
134. See, e.g., Hayden & Bodie, supra note 38, at 25–27 (observing that empirical studies upon
which the SEC and commentators relied involved proxy contests that were not directly comparable
to those that would have occurred under Rule 14a-11).
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Exchange Act of 1934 to promulgate rules “as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors,”135 in the National
Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Congress added the requirement that the SEC consider the degree to which its rules would
promote “efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”136 Commentators have debated the extent to which this amendment was designed to
sacrifice investor protection in favor of facilitating capital formation or
increasing U.S. market competitiveness.137 Notwithstanding this debate,
it is clear that the introduction of particularized statutory criteria authorized the courts to exercise increased judicial oversight.138
The nature of this increased oversight is, however, unclear. In a
careful and insightful new article, Jim Cox and Benjamin Baucom review the legislative history of this provision and conclude that there is
scant evidence Congress intended to change the standard for judicial review significantly or to impose substantial new burdens on SEC rulemaking.139 In particular, section 2(b) does not direct the SEC to conduct a
cost-benefit analysis.140
It is further worth noting, as Cox and Baucom do, that the language
in section 2(b) merely directs the SEC to consider specific factors; Congress did not tell the SEC how to balance these factors against each other, specify a dominant factor, or mandate a net positive outcome.141 In-

135. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-404, ch. 401, § 14(a), 48 Stat.
881, 895 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-pp).
136. Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106, 110 Stat. 3416, 3434 (1996) (adding section 2(b), which
provides, “Whenever pursuant to this subchapter [15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa] the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation”); see 15
U.S.C. § 77b(b).
137. See, e.g., Duke K. Bristow et al., Venture Capital Formation and Access: Lingering Impediments of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 77, 104 (2004) (expressing skepticism about the extent to which amendments to the National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) are likely to facilitate capital formation); Kevin A. Jones, The National
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996: A New Model for Efficient Capital Formation, 53
ARK. L. REV. 153, 155 (2000) (praising the NSMIA’s value for capital formation by preempting
inconsistent state regulation).
138. See, e.g., David W. Schnare, Environmental Rationality and Judicial Review: When Benefits Justify Costs Under the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, 5 HASTINGS W.-NW. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 65, 98 (1998) (explaining how 1996 Amendments to the Clean Water Act,
which mandate a specific process for the EPA’s cost-benefit analysis, establish a higher standard of
review than the APA’s hard look).
139. James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the
DC Circuit's Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811 (2012).
140. See, e.g., Schiller v. Tower Semiconductor, Ltd., 449 F.3d 286, 300 (2d Cir. 2006).
141. Cox & Baucom, supra note 139, at 1818–20.
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deed, many financial regulations are likely to produce conflicting results
when analyzed in accordance with these factors. For example, increasing
investor protection frequently imposes costs on capital formation, as illustrated most compellingly by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.142 Conversely,
reducing the disclosure requirements for emerging growth companies
sacrifices investor protection as illustrated by the JOBS Act.143 Thus, the
SEC’s consideration of the four statutory factors is unlikely to be outcome determinative.
How, then, should a court assess the SEC’s analysis under section
2(b)? The Supreme Court’s language in State Farm is instructive.144 Because section 2(b) identifies specific factors for the SEC’s consideration,
the SEC’s rulemaking should describe the manner in which it has considered those factors—efficiency, competition, and capital formation.145
Congress’s direction should be understood as a refinement of the SEC’s
rulemaking process, not an invitation to the court to second-guess the
SEC’s evaluation or prioritization of these factors.
The above-described statutory constraints result in a distinct antiregulatory bias. Specifically, as described in Part II.C of this Article,
the SEC faces a very high hurdle in justifying new regulations.146 In contrast, the SEC’s failure to act is largely unreviewable. Although courts
have occasionally upheld challenges to agency inaction in the face of a
specific statutory rulemaking obligation, as a general rule, agencies have
broad discretion to refrain from adopting regulations.147 Although the
existing deregulatory bias may or may not be normatively desirable, its
effect is significant in the context of congressionally directed rulemaking

142. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2002) (criticizing the costs imposed
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
143. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
144. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
145. See also Cox & Baucom, supra note 139, at 1831 (exploring the SEC’s analysis of the
section 2(b) factors in promulgating Rule 151A).
146. See Doering, supra note 13.
147. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. FDA, No. 11 Civ. 3562 (THK), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77384 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012) (finding that the FDA was arbitrary and capricious in failing
to act on the findings of its own task force in 1972 and failing to act on two citizen petitions filed in
1999 and 2005 on penicillin and other drugs that are added to animal feed in low-dose or
“subtherapeutic” levels to prevent animal disease). See generally Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (discussing the scope of judicial review for an agency’s failure
to adopt a proposed rule); Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing
and Transparency in the Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1190 (2009) (discussing
judicial review of an agency decision to withdraw proposed rulemaking).
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initiatives such as those mandated by Dodd-Frank. This Article will return to that issue in Part V.
IV. ADDITIONAL STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS ON SEC RULEMAKING
In addition to the substantive constraints previously discussed, the
SEC is subject to structural requirements concerning its rulemaking procedures. Two of these requirements are of particular importance in the
context of Rule 14a-11: the notice-and-comment requirements of the
APA and the open-meeting requirement of the Sunshine Act. This Part
considers these additional constraints, which are often overlooked in the
analysis of SEC rulemaking but which play a critical role in the effectiveness, or ineffectiveness, of the rulemaking process. Notably, the constraints described in this Part are not unique to the SEC but apply to a
variety of executive and independent agencies. This Part focuses specifically on their application to SEC rulemaking.
A. The Notice-and-Comment Procedure
The APA requires administrative agencies to follow specific procedures when they engage in rulemaking.148 In particular, section 553 of
the APA requires most agency rulemaking to comply with the noticeand-comment procedure.149 Agencies using this procedure must publish a
general notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, including
“(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.”150 The agency must then
provide at least thirty days for interested parties to submit their data,
views, or arguments for agency consideration.151 The agency then considers the comments it receives and adopts a final rule, which must be
published in the Federal Register before it is effective.152

148. Technically, notice-and-comment rulemaking is informal agency rulemaking. Formal
rulemaking requires a hearing and is akin to a trial. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557.
149. Id. § 553. Agencies can avoid the notice-and-comment requirements by issuing informal
guidance or interpretive rules. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal
Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397 (2007) (explaining how agencies use these mechanisms to bypass the notice-and-comment procedure).
150. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1)–(3).
151. See id. § 553(c)–(d).
152. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and
the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1321 (1992)
(describing requirements for the promulgation of legislative rules).
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Courts have elaborated on these requirements. An agency must, for
example, provide fair notice of both its originally intended rule and its
final rule—substantial changes between the two may be held to have deprived the public of its opportunity to comment.153 Agencies must disclose the data upon which they have relied and justify their decision in
terms of the administrative record.154 Finally, agencies must consider
reasonable alternatives, including alternatives suggested by commenters.155
The SEC’s notice-and-comment procedures have evolved over
time. Although written comments are open to the public, for many years
these comments were only available at the SEC library or through a request for photocopies. Today, comments may be submitted electronically
and are available on the SEC website.156 Importantly, however, the process only provides the public with access to the substance of comments
that are communicated in writing.
The notice-and-comment process is not the exclusive mechanism
interested parties use to communicate their views to SEC officials. A
substantial number of these communications take place through private
meetings between SEC officials and interested parties. Although the SEC
discloses the existence of these meetings and the identities of the participants in the comment file, the meetings are not open to the public, and
the substance of the discussions is not publicly available.157
In an effort to provide the public with the opportunity to give input
on regulatory proposals at an earlier stage—an effort motivated by the
rulemaking directives in Dodd-Frank—the SEC created a new publiccomment page in 2010.158 The new page enables interested parties to

153. See Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1103–05 (4th Cir. 1985).
154. Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify
Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997).
155. See, e.g., Laclede Gas Co. v. FERC, 873 F.2d 1494, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[W]here a
party raises facially reasonable alternatives . . . the agency must either consider those alternatives or
give some reason . . . for declining to do so.”).
156. Comments may be submitted with an online form, by e-mail, through Regulations.gov, or
in writing. The SEC posts all comments on its website—paper comments are scanned and posted in
a PDF format. See How to Submit Comments on SEC Rulemaking, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
http://www.sec.gov/rules/submitcomments.htm (last modified Jan. 1, 2009).
157. See also Keith Paul Bishop, Ex Parte Communications and SEC Rulemaking, CAL. CORP.
& SEC. LAW (June 19, 2012), http://calcorporatelaw.com/2012/06/ex-parte-communications-andsec-rulemaking/ (describing and criticizing the SEC’s use of private meetings and its failure to disclose more information about them).
158. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PUBLIC COMMENT PAGE FOR SEC INITIATIVES UNDER DODDFRANK ACT, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/regreformcomments.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2012).
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provide comments even prior to the SEC’s formal rulemaking proposals.159
At the same time, the SEC announced that it would follow “newlyestablished best practices when holding meetings with interested parties
in order to ensure full transparency to the public.”160 Despite these best
practices, the memoranda of meetings included in the public-comment
file continue to disclose only the identities of the parties involved and the
general topic under discussion unless the participants voluntarily provide
additional written information.161 The memoranda do not include a description of the position taken by the parties, arguments or other information provided to the Commission and its staff, or any other substantive
information.
B. Government in the Sunshine Act
Although commentators have examined and criticized the noticeand-comment procedure in some detail, the other structural constraint—
the Government in the Sunshine Act162—has received less attention. The
Sunshine Act was passed in 1976 as part of the open-records reforms
adopted in response to the Watergate era.163 The Act requires that meetings of multi-member government agencies be open to the public with at
least seven days advance public notice.164 The Act defines a meeting as
the “deliberation” of at least a quorum of individual agency members
regarding agency business.165 As applied to the SEC, this definition
159. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Chairman Schapiro Announces Open
Process for Regulatory Reform Rulemaking (July 27, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2010/2010-135.htm.
160. Id.
161. These meetings continue to occur frequently. For example, the SEC’s Dodd-Frank website disclosed eighty-four meetings prior to June 15, 2012, concerning the topic of definitions including swap and security-based swap under Title VII of Dodd-Frank. See Comments on Concept Release: Definitions Contained in Title VII of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-10/s71610.shtml#meetings
(last visited Oct. 16, 2012).
162. 5 U.S.C. § 552b.
163. See Daniel P. Finney, Watergate Scandal Changed the Political Landscape Forever, USA
TODAY (June 16, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-06-16/watergate-scandalchanged-political-landscape/55639974/1. Other reforms adopted in response to Watergate were the
Ethics in Government and Presidential Records Acts.
164. The Sunshine Act lists ten exemptions that largely parallel the exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act. Special Comm., Admin. Conference of the U.S., Report & Recommendation by the Special Committee to Review the Government in the Sunshine Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REV.
421, 421 (1997). Importantly, unlike the Freedom of Information Act, the Sunshine Act does not
contain an exemption for predecisional meetings. Id.
165. 5 U.S.C. § 552b. The House Judiciary Committee noted, in hearings held the year after
the adoption of the Sunshine Act, that the vague definition of “meeting” had the potential effect of
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means that no more than two SEC commissioners can meet privately to
discuss or deliberate agency business.166
The purpose of the Act is to render agency policymaking transparent by subjecting it to public view.167 In effect, however, the Act precludes private policy deliberations among agency heads and undermines
the collaborative and bipartisan structure of the SEC.168 By requiring that
discussions take place in public, the Act subjects them to media scrutiny,
interest-group attention, and political pressure.169 These pressures make it
more difficult for commissioners to modify their positions and engage in
compromise. They also have the counterintuitive effect of reducing the
transparency of the agency’s true decisionmaking.170 As a result, public
meetings have become, in effect, formal procedures in which commissioners articulate their previously developed positions on the stated
agenda items rather than engage in meaningful discussions.171

undermining the ability of agencies to engage in their regular operations. See Government in the
Sunshine Act Implementation: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 6–7 (1977) [hereinafter Hearing]
(statement of Richard Berg, Exec. Sec’y, Admin. Conference of the U.S.) (noting the difficulty of
drawing a line identifying preliminary discussions that would not be subject to the Act).
166. During periods in which there are vacancies on the Commission, a quorum consists of two
commissioners, and the Sunshine Act prohibits any private meetings or discussions between the
commissioners. The SEC frequently operates with one or more vacant seats. See, e.g., Commissioner
Paul Atkins Stepping Down From SEC, NAT’L J., May 5, 2008 (describing both Democratic seats on
the Commission as vacant); Lynn Stevens Hume, Loss of Roberts May Put SEC in Legal Bind, Lawyers Say, BOND BUYER, May 25, 1995 (reporting that a third commissioner’s departure would leave
the SEC with just two sitting commissioners).
167. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 190 (1997) (explaining the rationale for the
Sunshine Act). The Act allows the public to attend and observe these meetings but does not provide
the public with an affirmative power to participate. Id.
168. See id. at 210–17 (explaining tension between participation and deliberation).
169. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 165, at 10 (statement of Richard Berg, Exec. Sec’y, Admin.
Conference of the U.S.) (noting that observers are likely to take advantage of comments made during
public meetings to challenge or delay the rulemaking process because “[t]he temptation to the practicing bar of getting in last licks on the strength of what has occurred in the commission meeting is
well-nigh irresistible”).
170. See also Rossi, supra note 167, at 228–29 (explaining how public observation impairs
collegiality of agency decisionmaking).
171. See Randolph May, Reforming the Sunshine Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 415, 416 (1997)
(“Rather than actual, collective deliberation in public, agency members often use the open meeting
merely to announce and explain their positions.”); Marcia Coyle, Agencies Ask for Less Sunshine,
NAT’L L.J., Sept. 25, 1995, at A12 (quoting SEC Commissioner Steven Wallman as stating that open
meetings are “short, scripted and perfunctory events involving no deliberation among agency officials”).
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How then, does the SEC engage in policymaking? The SEC responded to the adoption of the Sunshine Act in three ways.172 First, individual commissioners delegated policy discussions to members of their
staffs, who were not subject to the mandates of the Act. Although staff
members could privately discuss agency policy, they lacked the authority
to modify the substantive positions of the commissioners whose views
they represented. This in turn reduced the prospect of compromise. Second, the SEC began to make more frequent use of notation voting, in
which a matter was presented to commissioners for seriatim action without face-to-face discussion.173 Third, and perhaps most problematically,
the Act encouraged commissioners to air disagreements in the form of
public criticism of, or dissent from, agency decisions.174
The Sunshine Act had the effect of concentrating the Commission’s
power in the chairman’s office.175 By shifting the decisionmaking mechanism from that of a collegial group process to an individual
decisionmaker, the Act arguably undercut the rationale for the Commission’s structure. First, this shift dissipated the effect of having an agency
headed by multiple members.176 A variety of studies have noted the differences between individual and collective decisionmaking,177 and the
absence of an opportunity for group deliberation creates a fundamental
change in the character of SEC decisions. Second, by removing a vehicle
172. See Kathy Bradley, Note, Do You Feel the Sunshine? Government in the Sunshine Act: Its
Objectives, Goals, and Effect on the FCC and You, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 473 (1997) (explaining
agency policymaking responses to the adoption of the Sunshine Act).
173. See Special Comm., supra note 164, at 424 (describing increased use of notation voting
by agencies subject to the Sunshine Act); Hearing, supra note 165, at 78 (statement of Harvey Pitt,
Gen. Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (describing notation voting).
174. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., A Commissioner’s Anger, in INSIGHTS 4, 4 (1991) (criticizing
Commissioner Fleischman’s public statements about the Commission and observing that, because of
the Sunshine Act, Commissioner Fleischman lacked an appropriate forum for airing those concerns
privately).
175. See, e.g., RICHARD K. BERG ET AL., AN INTERPRETIVE GUIDE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN
THE SUNSHINE ACT 222 (2d ed. 2005) (“There is clear evidence to support the view that [the Sunshine Act has] . . . served to enhance the influence of agency chairmen and staff.”).
176. See Special Comm., supra note 164, at 424 (“[T]he principal reason that Congress has
established multi-member agencies in the first place is because Congress has made the judgment
that, for the matters subject to the agency’s jurisdiction, there is a benefit from a collegial
decisionmaking process that brings to bear on the ultimate decisions the diverse viewpoints of agency members who have differing philosophies, experiences, and expertise.”). It is worth noting that
state corporate law has expressed a similar judgment in providing that corporations are to be managed under the direction of boards of directors that exercise collective rather than individual authority. See, e.g., Fogel v. U.S. Energy Sys., Inc., No. 3271-CC, 2007 WL 4438978 (Del. Ch. Dec. 13,
2007) (determining that an action of individual directors outside the context of a formal board meeting did not constitute an action on behalf of the corporation).
177. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12–19 (2002) (summarizing empirical studies of group decisionmaking).
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for collective deliberation, the Act reduced the value of the requirement
of a bipartisan commission by limiting the ability of minority commissioners to influence regulatory outcomes.
The Act also changed the manner in which commissioners received
information. In particular, because of its mandates, the Act prioritized the
commissioners’ access to information from interest groups and other
stakeholders at the expense of information exchanges among the commissioners themselves. Because commissioners bring a range of experiences and expertise to the agency, this shift sacrificed the sharing of that
collective knowledge among the group of commissioners.
In 1995, the chair of the Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS) was asked to review the Sunshine Act in light of these
concerns.178 The chair established a special committee, held a series of
public meetings, and concluded that there was substantial credible evidence that the Act was having a negative effect on collective
decisionmaking by multi-member agencies.179 The committee concluded
that Congress should establish a pilot program to enable agencies to engage in preliminary policymaking and deliberations outside of the public-meeting context.180 Shortly after the committee made its recommendations, however, Congress terminated the funding of the ACUS,181 and
the committee’s recommendations were abandoned.182
C. The Effect of These Constraints
Although both the notice-and-comment process and the Sunshine
Act have been defended in terms of transparency and democratic values,
they sacrifice consensus building as well as decisionmaking efficiency,
and they allow for the increased influence of political forces and interest
groups.183 These sacrifices are of particular concern in the context of
SEC rulemaking. Financial regulation involves high stakes and repeat
industry players who have extensive control over critical information and
178. Special Comm., supra note 164, at 421.
179. See id.
180. Id.; see also May, supra note 171 (defending the special committee’s recommendation for
a pilot program). Mr. May served as the chairman of the special committee. Id. at 415 n.a.; see also
William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative Law—Three Examples as
an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171 (2009) (advocating an exception for predecisional debate).
181. See May, supra note 171, at 415 n.1 (citing H.R. Res. 2099, 104th Cong. (1995) (enacted)).
182. Alan B. Morrison, Farewell Fond ACUS, We Loved You Well, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 169, 169
(1998).
183. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and The Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 595 (1984) (noting that “candor and the flexibility
necessary for collaboration or compromise are more likely to flourish in the shade”).
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ample financial resources, which they can use to influence the rulemaking process.184 The SEC’s rulemaking structure enables these interest
groups to engage in a high level of participation. More importantly, it
allows industry groups to control the administrative record by submitting
extensive comments and studies to which the SEC is then obligated to
respond. As one legal advisor put it, “the D.C. Circuit’s decision underscores the importance of including in one’s comments expert and empirical analyses to contradict (or at least challenge) any unfounded assumptions, dubious principles, or debatable academic research on which an
agency’s own analysis might be based.”185
Cost-benefit analysis exacerbates this problem. Because regulated
entities generally bear the costs of new regulation, the rulemaking process creates incentives for them to highlight and overestimate those
costs. The SEC does not receive comparable assistance in evaluating the
benefits of its new regulations, which typically inure to the benefit of
dispersed and less politically effective investors, consumers, or capital
markets. Accordingly, industry groups dominate both the public and private mechanisms for provision of information and influence.186 They are
represented disproportionately in the comment letters and private meetings, and they provide the overwhelming majority of comments that include data, statistics, or alternatives to the proposed rulemakings.187
Several studies have documented the dominance of industry groups
in financial rulemaking. Kim Krawiec, for example, found that banks and
bank representatives have dominated Dodd-Frank rulemaking.188 In addition to filing lengthy submissions with supporting data and specially
commissioned studies, banks accounted for ninety-three percent of the
184. See Recent Case: Administrative Law—Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking—District
of Columbia Circuit Vacates Securities and Exchange Commission’s “Hedge Fund Rule”—
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006), 120 HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1397 (2007) (observing
that this rulemaking context may be “unique to the financial sector, in which systemic risk is high
and regulated parties face strong incentives—and have substantial power—to avoid regulation”).
185. Heath P. Tarbert, Challenging Federal Agency Rulemakings, METROPOLITAN CORP.
COUNS. (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/17129/challenging-federalagency-rulemakings.
186. See generally Matt Grossman, Interest Group Influence on US Policy Change: An Assessment Based on Policy History, 1 INTEREST GROUPS & ADVOC. 171 (2012), http://www.palgravejournals.com/iga/journal/v1/n2/full/iga20129a.html (documenting interest-group influence across a
range of policy areas).
187. See, e.g., CARY COGLIANESE, CHALLENGING THE RULES: LITIGATION AND BARGAINING
IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 73 tbl.2-2 (1994); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A
Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128
(2006).
188. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of Financial
Reform 37 (Mar. 25, 2012) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925431.
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private meetings with agency officials—meetings that are not open to the
public and are only summarily reported in the public-comment file without disclosure of the meeting content.189
In another recent study, Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes, and Lisa Peters find similar domination by regulated firms in the context of
EPA rulemaking.190 Their study documents the fact that “[r]egulated
firms submitted the vast majority of the detailed comments that had the
potential to influence agency decision makers and to which agencies had
to respond in order to satisfy reviewing courts.”191 Wagner and her colleagues also show that industry comments are more influential in affecting the final version of adopted rules.192
In addition to the loss of consensus-building and decisionmaking
efficiency, the Sunshine Act also increases the impact of political forces
by requiring a public meeting forum. Through this public forum, industry
groups and the media can draw attention to any political (rather than just
legal) vulnerabilities in the commissioners’ positions. Political forces are
of concern in SEC rulemaking because of the substantial political influence of the financial sector—an influence no doubt assisted by the substantial political contributions made by financial firms.193 One recent
empirical study found that political influence is likely to have a negative
effect on the quality of rulemaking.194 Stuart Shapiro and John Morrall
compare politically controversial rules to less salient ones and find that
less politically controversial rules have higher net benefits.195 In the case
of the SEC, it appears that political pressure has led the SEC to postpone
or scale back a number of controversial rule proposals.196
One can see the effect of these constraints on the emergence of
Rule 14a-11. The proxy access rule was stalled for years in response to
189. Id. at 7.
190. See generally Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of
EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99 (2011).
191. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicially Enforced Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Systematically Biases Results in Favor of Regulated Firms, PENN L. REGBLOG (Jan. 24, 2012),
http://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2012/01/judicially-enforced-notice-and-comment-rulemak
ing-systematically-biases-results-in-favor-of-regulate.html (describing study’s findings).
192. Wagner et al., supra note 190, at 128–29. Other studies have found similar results. See
generally Krawiec, supra note 188.
193. See, e.g., Securities & Investment, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/indus
tries/indus.php?ind=F07 (last visited Oct. 16, 2012) (summarizing political contributions by brokerage and investment banking firms).
194. See generally Shapiro & Morrall, supra note 129.
195. Id.
196. See Jesse Westbrook, Why the SEC Keeps Backpedaling, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Dec. 30, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_02/b4162024089183.htm
(detailing SEC backpedaling in response to lobbying by regulated entities).
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forceful business group opposition.197 The SEC repeatedly revised its
proposed rule, which, in every version, included complex qualification
requirements or triggering conditions developed in response to concerns
articulated by industry groups about excessive costs or the potential for
abuse.198 In response to interest-group lobbying and political pressure,199
the SEC structured its rule to exclude precisely the types of shareholders
most likely to use it—public pension funds and hedge funds.200 I have
written elsewhere on the deficiencies of the final rule, but throughout the
rulemaking process, the SEC did not propose or adopt a rule designed to
provide a meaningful level of proxy access, despite its claim that the rule
was designed to simulate personal attendance at a shareholder meeting.201
Most problematically, the SEC releases failed to make an affirmative case justifying either proxy access as a general matter or its specific
choices in promulgating the rule. In terms of the policy choice, nowhere
in its releases did the SEC make the affirmative claim that shareholder
nominations will improve corporate performance, corporate compliance,
or board functioning. The SEC offered no theory as to what types of
shareholders would seek to nominate directors or the purposes of these
nominations. Nowhere did the SEC discuss the effect that shareholdernominated directors were likely to have on board functioning.202
With respect to implementation, the rule was similarly deficient.
The SEC did not set out the basis for adopting the three-year and threepercent holding requirements. Although the SEC recognized that less
197. See, e.g., id. (describing how the SEC’s adoption of the rule was delayed in response to a
threatened lawsuit by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce); see also Fisch, supra note 15 (describing the
history of the proxy access rule).
198. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Abe Friedman, Managing Dir., Barclays Global Investors,
to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Aug. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-172.pdf (defending the requirement of triggering
events to prevent abuse of proxy “abuse by investors with short-term goals or take-over interests”).
199. See Kenneth L. Altman & James F. Burke, Proxy Access: A Study of 500+ Letters Submitted to the SEC on “Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations,” ALTMAN GROUP (Nov. 30,
2009), available at http://www.altmangroup.com/pdf/ProxyAccessAltmanGroupRpt.pdf (summarizing positions taken in comment letters on proxy access).
200. Fisch, supra note 15, at 463.
201. Id.; see also Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA.
L. REV. 1347, 1381–82 (2011) (arguing that there was substantial doubt that those investors who
would have qualified to use the proxy access rule would use the rule).
202. The SEC did cite one study on hybrid boards: CHRIS CERNICH ET AL., IRRC INST. FOR
CORP.
RESP.,
EFFECTIVENESS
OF
HYBRID
BOARDS
(2009),
available
at
http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/IRRC_05_09_EffectiveHybridBoards.pdf; see also Facilitating
Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, 29,074 n.349 (proposed June 18, 2009).
The SEC’s conclusion, based on this study, was that the rule “may result in improved company
performance, arising from improvements in board performance.” Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,073.
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than a third of publicly traded companies have even a single shareholder
who meets these requirements, the SEC releases did not defend its line
drawing.203 Nor did it explain how, in light of these statistics, the rule
was likely to have an impact. As Commissioner Casey observed in her
dissent from the SEC’s decision to adopt the rule, the result was simply
not a “meaningful” threshold.204
Finally, as with other recent rulemakings, in the SEC’s adoption of
Rule 14a-11, the SEC neither identified a problem that required redress
nor explained how Rule 14a-11 was designed to resolve a problem. Although the D.C. Circuit’s insistence on formal cost-benefit analysis was
incorrect, the SEC did not articulate a policy rationale for adopting a federal rule mandating proxy access and dictating a single set of circumstances under which that proxy access could occur. In short, under the
APA standard, the SEC’s actions appeared completely arbitrary, though
not for any of the reasons articulated by the D.C. Circuit.
The final version of Rule 14a-11 suffered greatly from the absence
of meaningful deliberation among the commissioners. Although Chairman Schapiro initially championed the rule, her support for proxy access
appeared to have decreased substantially by the time it was adopted.205
Commissioner Paredes raised a number of concerns in his dissent from
the Commission’s decision—most importantly the value of enabling
companies to adopt individually tailored proxy access provisions through
private ordering.206 Despite the potential for private ordering to address
the qualification requirements and line drawing with which the SEC
clearly struggled, the commissioners were unable to engage in the type of
meaningful discussion that could have produced a private-ordering backstop or alternative that might have won Commissioner Paredes’s support.
Similarly, as noted above, Commissioner Casey criticized the arbitrariness of the rule’s line drawing.207 Frank deliberations might have enabled
the Commission to produce numbers that both generated consensus and
had some rational basis. Perhaps most troubling was the fact that, as with

203. Fisch, supra note 15, at 460–65.
204. Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt
Amendments Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Aug. 25, 2010) (transcript
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510klc.htm).
205. See Fisch, supra note 15, at 477 (questioning whether the SEC had lost confidence in the
concept of proxy access).
206. See Troy Paredes, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting to Adopt
the Final Rule Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (Aug. 25, 2010) (transcript
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch082510tap.htm). I have taken a similar position. See Fisch, supra note 15.
207. Casey, supra note 204.
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a number of prior rulemakings, the commissioners’ disagreements were
aired in the form of public dissents rather than ironed out through private
deliberation and compromise.
V. RETHINKING JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
The preceding Part explains how the procedural requirements for
rulemaking, to which the SEC is subject, have the potential to disrupt the
quality of the resulting rules. More problematically, the negative effects
of transparency appear to have a chilling effect on the SEC’s ability to
make collective policy choices, its willingness to identify its policy
choices clearly, and its ability to defend the rationale for those choices.
Potential solutions to these problems, as noted earlier, include revising
the notice-and-comment procedures, limiting the application of the Sunshine Act to preliminary deliberations by SEC commissioners, or both.
Another option is to shift the locus of the policy determination
away from the SEC. If the D.C. Circuit’s concerns, for example, are
rooted in a distrust of the agency’s capacity for sound policy choices, or
if political or interest-group influence is compromising the agency’s independence, an alternative would be for Congress to reclaim a greater
role in designating regulatory policy.
Whether the SEC or Congress is better suited to formulate financial
regulatory policy raises a variety of questions about comparative institutional competence.208 These questions are properly the subject of another
article. It is unnecessary here, however, to address the normative question of whether Congress should exercise greater control over SEC rulemaking because Congress has done so, both in Dodd-Frank and the
JOBS Act. This Part then considers how explicit congressional rulemaking directives should affect the judicial oversight of the resulting SEC
rules.
What is perhaps most troubling about the Business Roundtable decision is the court’s failure even to acknowledge that Congress explicitly
authorized the SEC to adopt a proxy access rule as part of Dodd-Frank.
Notably, departing from Congress’s traditional approach to SEC rulemaking, in which Congress simply delegates general rulemaking authority “as necessary in the public interest or for the protection of investors,”209 Dodd-Frank includes several alternative statutory approaches.

208. For a careful approach to analyzing comparative institutional competence, see NEIL
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1997).
209. See supra note 135.
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The first approach is congressionally mandated rulemaking. In several provisions in Dodd-Frank, and many more in the JOBS Act, Congress determined for itself the nature of its desired regulatory changes
and directed the agency to adopt certain rules, specifying in some cases a
fair amount of detail over the manner in which the rules should operate.
An example of congressionally mandated rulemaking is “say on pay,” in
which Congress not merely authorized but in fact compelled the SEC to
adopt rules mandating advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation.210 Congressional rulemaking directives should shift the nature of
judicial oversight because Congress has resolved for itself the question of
whether say on pay is good policy rather than leaving it to the SEC's
judgment.
What role, then, should judicial review play? Suppose, for example,
that after conducting its notice-and-comment review, the SEC had determined that the costs of say on pay outweighed the benefits.211 Presumably, the SEC would nonetheless have been obligated, under the statute,
to adopt the rule. Accordingly, it seems that the court could not reject the
policy judgment upon which that rule was based. The case can be made
that specific statutory directives trump the general limitations on agency
lawmaking imposed by the APA. An alternative and perhaps better reading is that agency rulemaking in response to a statutory directive is, by
definition, not arbitrary.
Could a court nonetheless determine that the agency’s implementation of congressional policy was flawed? Presumably, a rule that utterly
failed to implement the mandated policy or that directly contradicted the
statutory requirements would be invalid. But implementation decisions
inherently involve line-drawing choices that lend a certain degree of arbitrariness to agency decisionmaking, as evidenced by Rule 14a-11. Line
drawing that is inconsistent with the statutory goals or utterly lacks a rationale may render a rule invalid. If, however, a court requires an agency
to defend its line-drawing choices with empirical data, it risks undermining Congress’s regulatory objectives or, worse, placing responsibility for
the structure of the regulation in the hands of industry players who control the data and can commission studies designed to support their policy
preferences.
210. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010). Congress’s mandate went on to specify required details of the rules such as the frequency of the vote, its advisory
nature, and its lack of effect on directors’ fiduciary obligations.
211. I have suggested this possibility in other work. See Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware:
Why Congress Should Stay out of Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731 (forthcoming
2013).
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Does the same analysis apply to proxy access? Not necessarily. In
the case of proxy access, Congress took a different approach—
authorizing but not mandating SEC rulemaking.212 Should the specific
rulemaking authorization lead a court to determine that Congress has
resolved the policy issue for itself, or does the agency, in regulating pursuant to the directive, need to justify its policy choice?
The question in the specific context of the proxy access rule is more
complicated. In adopting Dodd-Frank, Congress explicitly considered
statutorily mandating proxy access but ultimately decided against it.213
The implications of this legislative history are unclear. Does it mean that
Congress supported some type of proxy access but chose to leave the
details to the SEC’s discretion? Or does the history suggest that Congress
was unsure about the policy question of whether proxy access was desirable?
Either way, this history warrants consideration in determining
whether Congress had already resolved these policy questions and, if it
had, identifying the role that this resolution should have on the extent
and significance of the agency’s subsequent cost-benefit analysis. The
Business Roundtable case highlights the importance of considering congressional policy choices in determining the appropriate scope of judicial
oversight of agency rulemaking, and the Business Roundtable court utterly failed in that obligation. At a minimum, the court should have determined whether Congress had already made the decision that a proxy access rule was good policy. If it had, requiring the SEC to justify the
rulemaking usurps the role, not of the SEC, but of Congress.
Why then, one might ask, did the SEC fail to appeal the case to the
U.S. Supreme Court?214 One additional factor must be considered. If
212. See Dodd-Frank Act, § 971, 124 Stat. at 1915. A third option is for Congress to require
study of a particular issue, which would suggest that both it and the agency involved require additional information to decide the policy question involved as well as the appropriate extent of any
statutory delegation. Fiduciary duties of brokers and the scope of extraterritorial private rights of
action for securities fraud are two examples in which Congress required such studies in Dodd-Frank.
See id. § 913 (requiring SEC to conduct a study of the “effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory
standards of care” for brokers); id. § 929Y (requiring SEC to study extraterritoriality).
213. On June 16, 2010, Senator Dodd, one of the bill’s cosponsors, introduced a proposal that
would have incorporated proxy access, with a five-percent ownership threshold, into the statute,
rather than leaving a proxy access provision subject to discretionary SEC rulemaking. See Jonathan
B. Cohn et al., On Enhancing Shareholder Control: A (Dodd-) Frank Assessment of Proxy Access 9
(July 14, 2011) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1742506. The proposal was
subsequently dropped. Id.
214. See Ben Protess, S.E.C. Won’t Fight Ruling Striking Down Proxy Access, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Sept. 6, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/s-e-c-wont-fight-rulingstriking-down-proxy-access (reporting that the SEC would not appeal the decision to the Supreme
Court).

2013]

The Long Road Back

729

Dodd-Frank reflects a congressional determination on the desirability of
proxy access, it should be understood as changing the nature of the
SEC’s discretionary authority.
In the case of general delegations of rulemaking authority to an
agency, the agency has virtually no affirmative obligation to regulate.215
In the case of congressional mandates, however, Congress has presumably reduced the agency’s discretion, rendering a failure to act, or at least
a failure to act in accordance with the mandate, subject to challenge. If
Congress tells the agency to regulate, it is required to do so, and arguably
the APA then authorizes the court to determine whether the agency
rulemaking is faithful to the policy choices reflected in the statutory
mandate. At a minimum, the court should have the power to invalidate
rulemakings on the basis that they are ineffective in meeting the congressionally identified objectives. Even where Congress merely authorizes
but does not require rulemaking, a rule that fails to meet the implicit policy objective behind the authorization is arguably irrational.
This presents the most difficult challenge for the SEC with respect
to Rule 14a-11. As I have noted above and argued in more detail elsewhere, Rule 14a-11 offered little in terms of meaningful proxy access.216
To the extent that Congress’s authorization of a proxy access rule in
Dodd-Frank reflected the decision that a federal proxy access rule was
good regulatory policy, a rule that failed to provide effective access was
inconsistent with that congressional judgment. To the extent that the SEC
purported to articulate its own independent justification for the rule, or
for the line drawing it contained, the rule fell short on the very grounds
that the SEC offered in its defense—enhancing shareholders’ preexisting
state-law election rights by replicating their presence at a shareholders
meeting.
VI. CONCLUSION
Increasingly, intensive judicial scrutiny of agency rulemaking, and
the economic analysis in support of that rulemaking in particular, create
substantial challenges for the SEC. The SEC’s task is complicated by a
variety of statutory and structural constraints that frustrate the Commission’s ability to engage in collective decisionmaking. Although the D.C.
Circuit has framed its criticisms of SEC rulemaking in terms of flawed
economic analysis, the problem is more fundamental. A combination of
structural factors limits the ability of SEC commissioners to make regu215. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
216. See Fisch, supra note 15; Rock & Kahan, supra note 201.
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latory choices through collective deliberation and political compromise.
These limitations resulted in a proxy access rule that lacked both a meaningful justification for its adoption and, seemingly, the support of the
Commission itself, rendering the rule highly vulnerable. More problematically, Rule 14a-11 is not unique, and judicial invalidation of SEC
rulemaking has become commonplace.
The promulgation of poorly reasoned rules in which adopting agencies lack confidence is not easily corrected through the adoption of more
elaborate procedures for economic analysis. A stronger response to these
concerns would be to reconsider the dominance of transparency over
other values in the regulatory process. The proposals to amend the Sunshine Act and provide greater space for private agency deliberations
would be a valuable first step. A perhaps more politically feasible approach is for Congress to exert greater control over regulatory policy
choices. Although this approach would subject regulatory policymaking
to increased political pressure, reducing agency discretion over financialmarket regulation may be desirable and could potentially increase congressional accountability for capital-market regulation. This choice
would effect a significant change from the modern administrative state.
If courts cannot and do not trust agencies to make regulatory policy,
however, they should defer to Congress’s decision to make those policy
choices for itself.

